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NOTES
SHOULD JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS COUNT AS PRIOR
CONVICTIONS FOR APPRENDI PURPOSES?
InApprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court held that "[olther
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."1
From this holding, the Court established the general rule that due
process requires a jury to decide all issues leading to a sentence
enhancement above the prescribed statutory maximum. The Court
carved out a limited exception for prior convictions only. As a result,
if a trial court judge finds that the defendant had a prior conviction,
he may use this fact to enhance the defendant's sentence beyond a
statutory maximum without submitting it to a jury.2 The Third,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits are divided on the question of whether
juvenile adjudications can and should be characterized as "prior
convictions" for sentence enhancement purposes.? In addition to this
circuit split, as of January 2004, one state supreme court already
has weighed in on this issue. 4
1. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (emphasis added).
2. See id.
3. Compare United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 696 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that "[a]
prior nonjuryjuvenile adjudication that was afforded all constitutionally required procedural
safeguards can properly be characterized as a prior conviction for Apprendi purposes"), and
United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that juvenile
adjudications count as prior convictions forApprendi purposes), with United States v. Tighe,
266 F.3d 1187, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that nonjury juvenile adjudications do not
count as prior convictions for enhancement purposes).
4. State v. Hitt, 42 P.3d 732, 740 (Kan. 2002) (holding that "the Apprendi exception for
prior convictions encompasses juvenile adjudications").
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This Note examines the fundamental problems with allowing a
judge to count juvenile adjudications as prior convictions for
sentence enhancement purposes, within the meaning of the
Apprendi exception, without carefully scrutinizing the circum-
stances of the adjudication. The Court's decision in Apprendi did
not address "the unique issues that distinguish juvenile adjudica-
tions from adult convictions, such as the lack of a right to a jury
trial."5 Although it may be safe to assume these safeguards existed
in prior adult convictions, it is a mistake for a court to assume,
without further inquiry, that a juvenile received sufficient proce-
dural safeguards in his juvenile adjudication. Moreover, courts
should not assume that the "fact" of a juvenile adjudication always
establishes that the juvenile was "guilty," because the traditional
purpose of the juvenile court system is to rehabilitate, not to
establish guilt.
In this Note, Part I examines the Apprendi exception for prior
convictions and the Court's rationale behind this exception. Part II
describes the circuit split among the Third, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits over whether a juvenile adjudication should count as a
prior conviction forApprendi purposes. Part III outlines the history
and goals of the juvenile court system, specifically examining the
fundamental tension between the juvenile justice system's treat-
ment rationale and the adult criminal justice system's punishment
rationale. Part IV surveys various states' current practices of using
juvenile adjudications for sentence enhancement purposes. Part V
analyzes the problems with characterizing a juvenile adjudication
as a prior conviction for Apprendi purposes without carefully
scrutinizing the juvenile adjudication to determine whether the
juvenile received sufficient procedural safeguards for the court to
rely on that proceeding. Part VI evaluates three different ap-
proaches-building on current case law-which the Court could
take to resolve the circuit split. The Court could decide that juvenile
adjudications always count as prior convictions, that they never
count as prior convictions, or that juveniles should have the right
to a jury trial. This Note argues, based on the fundamental legal
and procedural differences between a juvenile adjudication and an
5. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1193.
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adult conviction, the Court should not automatically allow a
juvenile adjudication to count as a prior conviction without further
inquiry. Finally, this Note concludes by recommending that a court
scrutinize ajuvenile adjudication to identify any factual issues and
determine whether the juvenile received sufficient procedural
safeguards before deciding whether that adjudication should count
as a prior conviction and whether it needs to be submitted to ajury.
I. THE APPRENDI EXCEPTION FOR PRIOR CONVICTIONS
A. Apprendi v. New Jersey
In June 2000, the Supreme Court changed the course of sentenc-
ing law in the landmark decision Apprendi v. New Jersey.6 The
complex and frequently analyzed Apprendi decision rests on easily
understood facts. On December 22, 1994, police arrested Charles C.
Apprendi, Jr., for "fir[ing] several .22-caliber bullets into the home
of an African-American family that had recently moved into a
previously all-white neighborhood in Vineland, New Jersey."' That
same day, Apprendi "made a statement-which he later re-
tracted-that even though he did not know the occupants of the
house personally, 'because they are black in color he does not want
them in the neighborhood."'" Apprendi pled guilty to two counts of
firearm possession.9 The prosecution reserved the right to seek an
enhanced sentence under the New Jersey hate crime statute. '0 New
Jersey law prescribed a sentencing range of five to ten years
imprisonment for the most serious count, the possession of a
firearm for an unlawful purpose." The law prescribed a range often
6. 530 U.S. 466 (2000); see also Joseph L. Hoffman, Apprendi v. New Jersey: Back to the
Future?, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 255,255 (2001) (predicting that "Apprendi and its progeny will
dominate the field of determinate sentencing law into the foreseeable future"); Stephen A.
Saltzburg, Due Process, History, and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243,253
(2001) (arguing that "sentencing guidelines began the move toward due process and that
Apprendi invites new attention to the procedures that should be required if due process in
sentencing is to be a reality").
7. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 470.
11. Id. at 469-70 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(2) (West 1995)).
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to twenty years imprisonment for such an offense committed as a
hate crime. 2 The trial judge sentenced Apprendi to twelve years in
prison pursuant to this hate crime enhancement.
13
Apprendi appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior
Court of New Jersey, raising a Due Process Clause challenge to the
hate crime statute.14 He argued that "the finding of bias upon which
his hate crime sentence was based must be proved to a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt." 5 The New Jersey intermediate appellate court
found that "the state legislature decided to make the hate crime
enhancement a 'sentencing factor,' rather than an element of an
underlying offense," and therefore it need not be proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.' 6 A divided New Jersey Supreme Court
affirmed, explaining that the statute "did not 'create a separate
offense calling for a separate penalty.'" 7
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the procedural
due process question of "whether Apprendi had a constitutional
right to have a jury find ... [racial] bias on the basis of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt."18 In a 5-4 decision, the Court adopted the
principle that "[olther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt." 9 The fact of a prior conviction allows
a judge to enhance a sentence beyond the sentencing guideline
range without submitting that fact to a jury.
12. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7(a)(3) (West 1995). The New Jersey hate crime statute
applies when the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the "defendant in
committing the crime acted, at least in part, with ill will, hatred or bias toward, and with a
purpose to intimidate, an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, religion,
sexual orientation or ethnicity." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West 1995) (repealed 2001).
13. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471.
14. Id. (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 698 A.2d 1265 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997)).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 473 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 731 A.2d 485, 494 (N.J. 1999)).
18. Id. at 475-76. The Supreme Court limited its inquiry to the issue of procedural due
process, stating, "[we have previously rejected a First Amendment challenge to an enhanced
sentence based on a jury finding that the defendant had intentionally selected his victim
because of the victim's race." Id. at 475 n.1 (citing Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 480
(1993)).
19. Id. at 490 (emphasis added).
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B. History of the Apprendi Exception
The Apprendi exception for prior convictions is based on the
Court's holding in Almendarez-Torres v. United States.
20
Almendarez-Torres involved a statute that authorized a maximum
prison sentence of two years for an alien who returned to the
United States despite previous deportation, 21 but a maximum
prison sentence of twenty years for such an alien whose "initial
'deportation was subsequent to a conviction for [the] commission of
an aggravated felony."'22 The question before the Court was
"whether this latter provision defines a separate crime or simply [is
a sentencing factor] authoriz[ing] an enhanced penalty."23 The
Court held: "[It] is a penalty provision, which simply authorizes a
court to increase the sentence for a recidivist. It does not define a
separate crime."24 While normally elements of an offense must be
stated "in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven by the
[prosecution] beyond a reasonable doubt," the Almendarez-Torres
Court held that a prior conviction does not face these requirements
because recidivism is a sentencing factor.25
20. 523 U.S. 224 (1998). Some commentators have argued that the Court created the
Apprendi exception for prior convictions to avoid overruling the holding of Almendarez-
Torres. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Priester, Constitutional Formalism and the Meaning of
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 281,291 n.64 (2001) ("In Apprendi ... the Court
included an exception for recidivism, excepting the fact of a prior conviction from the
Apprendi principle.... The Court apparently did so to avoid having to overrule the holding[]
of Almendarez-Torres ... ) (citation omitted); James K. Robinson, Thirtieth Annual Review
of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals, 1999-2000, 89
GEO. L.J. 1045, 1048 (2001) ("The [Apprendil Court did not overrule its prior decision in
Almendarez-Torres holding that prior conviction of a crime may constitutionally be treated
as a sentencing factor rather than as an element of the offense ....").
21. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (1994)).
22. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (1994)).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 232, 248-49 (1999) (explaining the holding of
Almendarez.Torres).
2004] 1163
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C. Rationale Behind the Apprendi Exception
In order to determine whether a juvenile adjudication should
count as a prior conviction, it is necessary to analyze the rationale
behind the exception. The Court's rationale for the prior conviction
exception in Apprendi was that "the certainty that procedural
safeguards attached to any 'fact' of prior conviction ... mitigated the
due process and Sixth Amendment concerns otherwise implicated
in allowing a judge to determine a 'fact' increasing punishment
beyond the maximum of the statutory range."
26
The Court has not yet considered whether it is safe to assume
that due process and procedural safeguards were adhered to in a
juvenile adjudication. Although the Court held that it is sufficient
for a judge to rely on the "fact" of a prior conviction, it nevertheless
adopted its Apprendi exception for prior convictions only after
scrutinizing the facts inAlmendarez-Torres. In its interpretation of
Almendarez-Torres, the Court noted that "Almendarez-Torres had
admitted the three earlier convictions for aggravated felonies-all
of which had been entered pursuant to proceedings with substantial
procedural safeguards of their own."27 The Court thus left open the
issue of whether a juvenile adjudication would count as a prior
conviction, within the meaning of Apprendi, if that adjudication
lacked sufficient procedural safeguards. Indeed, while Justice
Thomas joined the Apprendi majority in ruling that "[o]ther than
the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for
a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt," his
concurring opinion nevertheless suggests that he would reconsider
the majority opinion inAlmendarez-Torres which is the foundation
for the Apprendi exception in the first place.28
26. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488 (2000).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 520-21 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas concluded that he had
"succumbed" to "one of the chief errors of Almendarez-Torres" and found that "it is evident
why the fact of a prior conviction is an element under a recidivism statute." Id. InApprendi,
Justice Thomas joined Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg in the majority
opinion, whereas in Almendarez-Torres, he had joined an entirely different majority
consisting of Justices Breyer, Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Kennedy. Id. at 468; Almendarez-
Torres, 523 U.S. at 226 (holding that a prior conviction of a crime was a sentencing factor
[Vol. 45:11591164
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In Jones v. United States, the Court analyzed a triumvirate of
procedural safeguards associated with prior convictions.29 It stated,
"unlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the
possible penalty for an offense ... a prior conviction must itself have
been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice,
reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees." 0 The Court also
emphasized the importance of the reasonable doubt and jury trial
safeguards in Apprendi. The Court noted:
[Tihere is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a
prior judgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in which
the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the right to
require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
and allowing the judge to find the required fact under a lesser
standard of proof. 1
As the Court explained in both Jones and Apprendi, the rationale
behind the prior conviction exception rests on the assumption that
there were sufficient procedural safeguards attached to the prior
proceeding for a sentencing judge to rely on the "fact of conviction"
in that prior proceeding. The historically different goals of the
juvenile justice system and adult criminal justice system have
resulted in significantly fewer procedural safeguards forjuveniles.32
Juvenile adjudications do not seek and are not meant to establish
guilt or innocence, but rather to determine what is in the best
interest of each child.33 Furthermore, social factors may influence
ajuvenile's disposition, which traditionally has not been considered
punishment.
rather than an element of the offense).
29. Jones, 526 U.S. at 249. This 1999 Supreme Court decision is distinct from the 2003
Third Circuit decision United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688 (3d Cir. 2003), discussed
primarily infra Part II.C. To avoid confusion, throughout the rest of this Note the 1999
Supreme Court decision Jones v. United States is always discussed in the same context as
the Apprendi decision and stands for the proposition that there is a triumvirate of procedural
safeguards associated with prior convictions.
30. Jones, 526 U.S. at 249.
31. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496.
32. See discussion infra Part III.A-B.
33. Juvenile courts are cognizant of society's interests; they simultaneously attempt to
rehabilitate the juvenile while attempting to preserve the best interests of the community.
See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
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II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Since Apprendi, three circuits have disagreed over whether a
juvenile adjudication should count as a prior conviction for
sentence enhancement purposes. In United States v. Tighe, the
Ninth Circuit held that "the use of Tighe's 1988 nonjury juvenile
delinquency adjudication to increase his maximum statutory
penalty violatedApprendi."34 Just one year later, the Eighth Circuit
ruled in United States v. Smalley that "juvenile adjudications can
rightly be characterized as 'prior convictions' for Apprendi pur-
poses."" In State v. Hitt, a state court case decided around the same
time as Smalley, the Supreme Court of Kansas held "the Apprendi
exception for prior convictions encompasses juvenile adjudica-
tions.""6 In January 2003, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
both Smalley and Hitt." By denying certiorari, the Supreme Court
has left the circuit split unresolved. 8 In June 2003, in United States
34. 266 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2001).
35. 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2002).
36. 42 P.3d 732, 740 (Kan. 2002). Hitt challenged the constitutionality of the Kansas
Sentencing Guidelines Act which provided that juvenile adjudications may be included in the
criminal history score without being charged in the indictment and proven to a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt as required by Apprendi. Id. at 734. The Supreme Court of Kansas
rejected Hitt's argument on the grounds that "U]uvenile adjudications are included within
the historical cloak of recidivism and enjoy ample procedural safeguards; therefore, the
Apprendi exception for prior convictions encompasses juvenile adjudications." Id. at 740. The
court explained, "[tihe Apprendi Court spoke in general terms of the procedural safeguards
attached to a prior conviction. It did not specify all procedural safeguards nor did it require
certain crucial procedural safeguards." Id.
37. Hitt, 42 P.3d 732, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1104 (2003); Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 1114 (2003). The Court asked the Solicitor General for his opinion as to
whether the Court should grant certiorari in Hitt. The Department of Justice recommended
that the Supreme Court deny certiorari in Hitt, but grant the petition for certiorari in
Smalley because the Department of Justice thought Smalley was a better vehicle for
reconsideringAlmendarez-Torres and deciding whether juvenile adjudications should count
as prior convictions for Apprendi purposes. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at
7, Hitt (No. 01-10864).
38. As a result of the Court's refusal to grant certiorari, the issue of whether juvenile
adjudications should count as prior convictions will generate additional judicial scrutiny in
other circuits and possibly exacerbate the circuit split. The Third Circuit has already weighed
in on the issue. See United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688 (3d Cir. 2003). In those circuits that
have not yet decided this issue, adults who receive sentences beyond the statutory maximum
undoubtedly will appeal their sentences.
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v. Jones, the Third Circuit joined the circuit split, agreeing with the
Eighth Circuit's reasoning.3 9
Tighe, Smalley, and Jones are the only circuit court decisions
that have dealt with the question of whether juvenile adjudications
should count as prior convictions forApprendi purposes. In all three
cases, the court reviewed the legality of using juvenile adjudications
to enhance an adult sentence above a prescribed statutory maxi-
mum of ten years pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA).4 ° "The [ACCA] mandates a minimum sentence of 15 years
for anyone convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) who is found to have three
previous convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense."4'
In the ACCA, Congress declared that "the term 'conviction' includes
a finding that a person has committed an act of juvenile delin-
quency involving a violent felony."
4 2
.The next three sections analyze the facts, holdings, and ratio-
nales behind Tighe, Smalley, and Jones, respectively, in the order
in which they were decided.
A. United States v. Tighe
In United States v. Tighe, the Ninth Circuit was the first circuit
to consider whether juvenile adjudications should count as prior
convictions for Apprendi purposes. Tighe pled guilty to a three-
count indictment, charging him, inter alia, with being a felon in
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).4 ' The
indictment did not state that Tighe would receive a minimum
sentence of fifteen years if he was found to be an armed career
criminal.44 At sentencing, the district court found that Tighe had a
total of three previous convictions which included one juvenile
39. 332 F.3d 688, 696 (3d Cir. 2003).
40. Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2000).
41. United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 18 U.S.C. §
924(e)(1) (2000)).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 924(eX2)(C). Although the statute makes a "juvenile delinquency
involving a violent felony" a 'conviction" by definition, nevertheless the statutory definition
may still be the subject of constitutional scrutiny.
43. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1190.
44. Id.
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adjudication. 45 The court enhanced his sentence based on the three
prior convictions pursuant to the ACCA.'6
Tighe challenged the ACCA as unconstitutional on its face and as
applied to him.47 The court quickly dismissed his facial challenge to
the statute and focused on Tighe's claim that the statute was
unconstitutional as applied to him because one of the three felony
convictions used to enhance his sentence was a juvenile adjudica-
tion at which he was not afforded the right to a jury trial.48 The
court noted that Congress specifically decided to allow juvenile
delinquency adjudications involving violent felonies to count as
predicate convictions, "[dlespite the lack of a jury trial and certain
other procedural protections in the context of most juvenile
proceedings .... 4"9 ForApprendi purposes, however, the Tighe court
distinguished this type of predicate conviction from an adult prior
conviction, finding:
At first blush, it may appear that Tighe's 1988juvenile adjudica-
tion, which Congress has characterized as a "prior conviction"
for the purposes of ACCA, falls precisely within Apprendi's
exception for"the fact of a prior conviction".... Such an analysis,
however, ignores the significant constitutional differences
between adult convictions and juvenile adjudications.5 °
The court concluded that "Apprendi's narrow 'prior conviction'
exception is limited to prior convictions resulting from proceedings
that afforded the procedural necessities of a jury trial and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the 'prior conviction' exception
does not include nonjury juvenile adjudications."5' In short, the




47. Id. at 1190-91.
48. Id. at 1191.
49. Id. (citing Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(C) (2000)).
50. Id. at 1192-93.
51. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194-95.
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B. United States v. Smalley
In United States v. Smalley, the Eighth Circuit disagreed with
the Ninth Circuit's Tighe decision. 2 The Smalley court held that
juvenile adjudications can count as prior convictions for Apprendi
purposes.53 The facts of Smalley are very similar to those of Tighe.
On May 9, 2001, Kansas City police officers arrested Smalley for
carrying a 9mm pistol in his waistband.54 Smalley pled guilty to
being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1), which carries a maximum penalty of ten years of
incarceration. The prosecutor for the United States recommended
a sentence enhancement beyond the normal statutory maximum
and the district court sentenced Smalley to fifteen years of incarcer-
ation pursuant to the ACCA."5 Two of the three prior convictions
that triggered the ACCA enhancement were juvenile adjudications
which occurred when Smalley was twelve years old.56 In the third
prior conviction, Smalley was certified as an adult under Missouri
law and pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter when he was
fifteen years old.57
The court rejected Smalley's argument that "because there was
no right to ajury in thejuvenile proceedings, these adjudications do
not fit the 'prior conviction' exception of Apprendi .... ", As in Tighe,
the Smalley court noted that "Congress characterized juvenile
adjudications as 'prior convictions' under the ACCA." s The court
acknowledged that "whether juvenile adjudications can be charac-
terized as 'prior convictions' for Apprendi purposes is a constitu-
tional question ...." Unlike Tighe, however, the Smalley court
viewed Apprendi and Jones as establishing that certain procedural
protections are sufficient, without specifying which procedural
protections are necessary for an adjudication to count as a prior
52. United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1032 (8th Cir. 2002).
53. Id. at 1033.
54. Brief for the United States at 2, Smalley (No. 02-6693).
55. Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2000).
56. Brief for Appellant at 12, Smalley (No. 01-3898). In 1992, Smalley admitted in
juvenile court to a first-degree robbery charge and a first-degree assault charge. Id. at 8.
57. Id. at 12.
58. Brief for the United States at 6, Smalley (No. 01-3898).
59. Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1031.
60. Id. at 1031-32.
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conviction for Apprendi purposes.6 The Smalley court held that
juvenile adjudications "are so reliable" that characterizing them as
"prior convictions" for Apprendi purposes does not offend due
process.62
C. United States v. Jones
In United States v. Jones, the Third Circuit addressed the issue
of whether "a prior juvenile adjudication, albeit nonjury, [should]
qualifty] as a 'prior conviction' for purposes of the Apprendi excep-
tion."63 On April 10, 2000, Jones entered an apartment in Pitts-
burgh brandishing two guns, one of which he fired twice.64 He stole
"$10,000 in cash and some clothing."65 Just like Tighe and Smalley,
Jones was charged with possession of a firearm in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which carries a maximum penalty of ten years
incarceration under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(2). 66 The District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania found that Jones was subject
to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) of the ACCA, which "mandates a minimum
sentence of [fifteen] years imprisonment for anyone convicted of
being a felon in possession [of a firearm] in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1) who is found to have three previous convictions for a
violent felony or serious drug offense."6 7 The District Court held
that 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) applied to Jones because he had "two adult
state felony drug convictions and one prior juvenile adjudication for
a violent crime, thereby constituting the necessary three prior
convictions for application of the ACCA."6' Jones was convicted and
61. Id. at 1032 ("[WIhile the Court established what constitutes sufficient procedural
safeguards (a right to jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt), and what does not
(judge-made findings under a lesser standard of proof), the Court did not take a position on
possibilities that lie in between these two poles."). Summarizing its position, the court
explained, "it is incorrect to assume that it is not only sufficient but necessary that the
'fundamental triumvirate of procedural protections'... underl[ie] an adjudication before it can
qualify for the Apprendi exemption." Id.
62. Id. at 1033.
63. United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 694 (3d Cir. 2003).







sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment with a subsequent four-
year term of supervised release.69
Jones appealed his conviction to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit on three grounds. First, he raised the
statutory claim that his prior juvenile adjudication did not fit under
the ACCA's definition of a "violent felony." ° Second, he raised the
constitutional challenge that his prior juvenile adjudication should
not count as a "prior conviction" for purposes of the Apprendi
exception because his juvenile proceedings were not held before a
jury.7 Finally, Jones claimed "that the District Court violated his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel by enhancing his sentence based
upon his prior juvenile adjudication because records for that
adjudication do not indicate that he was represented by counsel and
do not show that he waived his right."72 Only his second and third
arguments are relevant for the purposes of this Note.
The Jones court summarized the circuit split between Tighe and
Smalley and sided with the Smalley court. It held, "when a juvenile
is adjudicated guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a bench trial that
affords all the due process protections that are required, the
adjudication should be counted as a conviction for purposes of
subsequent sentencing under the ACCA."
73
With respect to the Sixth Amendment claim, the record was
silent as to whether Jones was represented by counsel during his
juvenile adjudication, and if he, was not, whether he waived his
right to counsel. 74 When an appellant fails to establish that his prior
conviction suffers a constitutional infirmity, the court attaches the
presumption of regularity to the conviction.75 Since the record from
69. Id.
70. Id. at 691.
71. Id. at 694.
72. Id. at 696-97.
73. Id. at 696.
74. Id. at 697.
75. Id. at 698 (citing Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 (1992)). Interestingly, the court noted
as a preliminary matter,
Jones does not allege that he was not represented by counsel during his
juvenile adjudication. Instead, he argues that where, as here, the certified
records from a prior conviction do not show that the defendant was represented
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Jones' juvenile adjudication was silent, the court rejected Jones'
contention that "the Government must prove that he was either
afforded his right to counsel or waived that right."71
III. THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. Juvenile Justice Goals
Before analyzing theApprendi issues raised by juvenile adjudica-
tions, a review of the history of juvenile courts helps explain why
juvenile courts have fewer procedural safeguards and are more
informal than adult criminal courts. The juvenile court movement
began in the United States near the end of the nineteenth century
because "reformers were appalled by adult procedures and penal-
ties, and by the fact that children could be given long prison
sentences and mixed in jails with hardened criminals."" The
fundamental goal of the first juvenile courts was to provide
assistance for juveniles.78 The traditional focus was on individual
treatment and rehabilitation, rather than finding guilt and
imposing punishment. 7' The early reformers believed that "juve-
niles lack the mens rea ... necessary ... to establish criminal
culpability ...."8 Juvenile courts insisted "that the proceedings were
not adversary, but that the state was proceeding as parens
patriae."81 John T. Whitehead and Steven P. Lab, authors of
Juvenile Justice, described the early juvenile courts as follows:
76. Id. at 698.
77. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967).
78. JOHN T. WHITEHEAD & STEVEN P. LAB, JUVENILE JUSTICE 46 (1996).
79. William T. Stetzer, Note, The Worst of Both Worlds: How the Kansas Sentencing
Guidelines Have Abandoned Juveniles in the Name of"Justice," 35 WASHBURN L.J. 308, 316
(1996). Reformers believed that "society's role was not to ascertain whether the child was
'guilty' or 'innocent,' but '[w]hat is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be
done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward career.'"
Gault, 387 U.S. at 15 (quotingJulian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104, 119-20
(1909)). Since the courts' decisions are often driven by the best interest of the child rather
than the question of the child's guilt or innocence, juvenile adjudications may not be reliable
for the purposes of establishing a juvenile's guilt.
80. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRIVACY AND JUVENILE
JUSTICE RECORDS: A MID-DECADE STATUS REPORT 6 (May 1997) [hereinafter PRIVACY AND
JUVENILE JUSTICE RECORDS].
81. Gault, 387 U.S. at 16; see also WHITEHEAD & LAB, supra note 78, at 47-50.
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[T]he Uuvenilel court was to operate in a highly informal
manner without any of the trappings of the adult court. Lawyers
and other adversarial features of the adult system (such as rules
of evidence and testimony under oath) were discouraged. The
judge was to take a paternal stance toward the juvenile and
provide whatever help and assistance was needed. The empha-
sis was on assisting the youth rather than on punishing an
offense.... The court was not restricted to dealing with youths
who committed criminal acts. Rather, the court could intervene
in any situation where a youth was considered to be in need of
help.1
2
As a result of this rehabilitation rationale, the Court justified
making the juvenile court less formal. The first juvenile courts did
not provide juveniles with any of the due process rights that the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide to adults. 3
To distinguish a juvenile adjudication from an adult criminal
proceeding, the juvenile court adopted a distinct "civil" vocabulary. 4
A juvenile is "adjudicated" as "delinquent" rather than "convicted"
as "guilty" of a crime.85 Moreover, juvenile courts grant a "disposi-
tion" rather than "sentencing" the juvenile.86
State legislatures have emphasized the rehabilitative goal of the
juvenile justice system. Most states have a juvenile court statute
which contains a preamble or "purpose clause" to aid the courts in
interpreting legislative intent.8 7 The historical purpose of the
juvenile court as stated in these purpose clauses has been simulta-
neously to "serve the moral, emotional, mental, and physical
welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community ..,
82. WHITEHEAD & LAB, supra note 78, at 46.
83. See discussion infra Part III.B.
84. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE RECORDS AND
RECORDKEEPING SYSTEMS 11 (Nov. 1988) [hereinafter RECORDKEEPING SYSTEMS]; see also
Gault, 387 U.S. at 17 ("[Piroceedings involving juveniles were described as 'civil' not
Icriminal' and therefore not subject to the requirements which restrict the state when it seeks
to deprive a person of his liberty.").
85. RECORDKEEPING SYSTEMS, supra note 84, at 11.
86. See, e.g., WHITEHEAD & LAB, supra note 78, at 446.
87. Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment,
Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 841 (1988).
88. Id. (quoting ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 37/701-2 (West 1972)).
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B. The Extension of Due Process Rights to Juveniles
During the early years of the juvenile justice system, juveniles
were denied due process rights in court proceedings. Since the
original goal of the juvenile system was to achieve that which was
in the child's best interest, "traditional notions of adult criminal due
process and procedure were thought unnecessary, if not detrimen-
tal, to cure the juvenile of the 'disease of delinquency.'" 9
Nearly a half century after the creation of the first juvenile court
in Illinois in 1899, the Supreme Court, in Haley v. Ohio, considered
the extension of due process rights to juveniles for the first time.90
In 1966 in the landmark case Kent v. United States, the Court
extended some traditional due process rights tojuveniles.9" In Kent,
the Court declared that a juvenile court must satisfy basic require-
ments of "due process and fair treatment" before transferring a
juvenile to an adult court.92 The Court decided that due process
entitles a juvenile to certain minimum procedural safeguards,
including the right to a hearing-albeit an informal hearing-and
the right to the assistance of an attorney at that hearing before he
can be transferred into an adult criminal court.9" One year after
Kent, In re Gault extended to juveniles in juvenile proceedings the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the Sixth
Amendment rights to notice of the charges against them, to
confront and cross-examine their accusers, and to the assistance of
counsel. 94 The Court also extended to juveniles the due process
safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in In re Winship.95 In
89. David Dormont, Note, For the Good of the Adult: An Examination of the
Constitutionality of Using Prior Juvenile Adjudications to Enhance Adult Sentences, 75
MINN. L. REV. 1769, 1777 (1991).
90. 332 U.S. 596, 598-99 (1948) (holding inadmissible a confession extracted from a
fifteen-year-old juvenile).
91. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
92. Id. at 562; see also Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., The Right to a Public Jury Trial: A Need
for Today's Juvenile Court, 76 JUDICATURE 230, 238 (1993).
93. Kent, 383 U.S. at 561; see WHITEHEAD & LAB, supra note 78, at 236.
94. See WHITEHEAD & LAB, supra note 78, at 238 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-57
(1967)).
95. 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (holding "the constitutional safeguard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is as much required during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency
proceeding as are those constitutional safeguards applied in Gault .... ").
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Breed v. Jones, the Court held that juvenile courts must adhere to
the double jeopardy protections offered by the Fifth Amendment.96
In less than thirty years, the Court extended to juveniles every
federal constitutional protection afforded adult criminal defendants
except the right to a jury trial. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the
Court held that "trial by jury in the juvenile court's adjudicative
stage is not a constitutional requirement." Although the Sixth
Amendment guarantees the right to an impartial jury "[iun all
criminal prosecutions,"99 nevertheless the Court decided that a
juvenile court proceeding was not a "'criminal prosecution,' within
the meaning and reach of the Sixth Amendment." 100
C. The Evolving View of Juvenile Offenders
Many commentators and even the Supreme Court have recog-
nized that the juvenile justice system in reality may not be serving
its original goal of rehabilitation.'' The juvenile court system is
"clearly more punitive now than it was two decades ago."'0 2 Despite
this sea change, juveniles still are not uniformly afforded the same
procedural safeguards as adults. Less than four years after
McKeiver, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "in terms of
potential consequences, there is little to distinguish an adjudicatory
96. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
97. ROBERT R. BELAIR, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION POLICY:
PRIVACY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE RECORDS 20 (1982).
98. 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). The Court concluded that "one cannot say that in our legal
system the jury is a necessary component of accurate factfinding." Id. at 543.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
100. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 541.
101. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) ("[Tihere may be grounds for
concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for
children.") (citing Joel F. Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems
of Function and Form, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 7); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 19 n.23 (1967).
The Court further stated:
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose ofjuvenile courts,
studies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions as to whether
actual performance measures well enough against theoretical purpose to make
tolerable the immunity of the process from the reach of constitutional
guaranties applicable to adults.
Kent, 383 U.S. at 555.
102. Sanborn, supra note 92, at 234.
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hearing ... from a traditional criminal prosecution."" 3 In the 1960s,
an increase in "the frequency and severity of juvenile crime eroded
confidence in the belief that juveniles lacked the criminal culpabil-
ity necessary to be judged 'guilty' of crimes."0 4
In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice's Task Force Report commented on the
failures of the juvenile justice system. 10 According to the report:
In theory the juvenile court was to be helpful and rehabilitative
rather than punitive. In fact the distinction often disappears ....
In theory the court's action was to affix no stigmatizing label. In
fact a delinquent is generally viewed by employers ... as a
criminal .... In theory the court's operations could justifiably be
informal, its findings and decisions made without observing
ordinary procedural safeguards, because it would act only in the
best interest of the child. In fact it frequently does nothing more
nor less than deprive a child of liberty without due process of
law .... 106
The juvenile system has become more punitive and criminal in
nature since Gault was decided in 1967.07 The juvenile is no longer
merely treated for his crime; he is now being punished.
The vocabulary of the juvenile justice system is no longer "civil."
In Gault, the Court recognized that labeling ajuvenile adjudication
"civil" is misleading because it could lead to incarceration against
one's will.'0° The Court decided that it would no longer succumb to
the "feeble enticement of the 'civil' label-of-convenience which has
been attached to juvenile proceedings." 1 9
103. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529, 531 (1975).
104. PRIVACY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE RECORDS, supra note 80, at 7.
105. McKeiver,403 U.S. at 544 n.5 (citing PRESIDENT'SCOMMISSIONONLAWENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH
CRiME 9 (1967)).
106. Id.
107. See Sara E. Kropf, Note, Overturning McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: The
Unconstitutionality of Using Prior Convictions to Enhance Adult Sentences Under the
Sentencing Guidelines, 87 GEO. L.J. 2149,2173 (1999).
108. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967) ("[J]uvenile proceedings to determine 'delinquency,'
which may lead to commitment to a state institution, must be regarded as 'criminal' for
purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination.").
109. Id. at 50.
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Amendments to state juvenile statutes reflect a new, expressly
punitive purpose underlying the juvenile justice system."' In the
1980s alone, ten legislatures revised theirjuvenile statutes' purpose
clauses to deemphasize rehabilitation, and instead emphasize
public safety, punishment, and individual accountability."'
As the juvenile justice system shifts its focus towards offense-
based punishment, "it] he historical justifications for the procedural
deficiencies of thejuvenile court are increasingly untenable."" 2 The
Court should decide whether it wants to extend the same proce-
dural safeguards tojuveniles as adults or decriminalize thejuvenile
system and return it to its original goal of rehabilitation.
IV. CURRENT PRACTICES OF USING JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS FOR
SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT PURPOSES
In the 1980s, legal scholars launched a movement to allow
juvenile court records to factor into criminal court sentencing."'
This movement was spurred by an upward trend in the rate of
violent crime among teenagers."" According to the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, while "[t]he vast majority ofj uveniles desist from
crime, ... a small minority engag[e] in chronic and serious recid-
ivistic behavior.""i In 1992, the U.S. Attorney General's Task Force
on Combating Violent Crime recommended that states amend their
sentencing provisions to allow juvenile adjudications to enhance
adult sentences.
116
110. Feld, supra note 87, at 842. For a discussion of state juvenile statutes, see supra
notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
111. Feld, supra note 87, at 842.
112. Id. at 909.
113. See Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Striking Out on the First Pitch in Criminal Court, 1
BARRY L. REV. 7, 12-13 (2000) ([D]evelopments within academic circles (especially between
1978 and 1984) contributed mightily to launching the movement to allow juvenile court
records to have actual and open recidivist impact in criminal court sentencing."). In the late
1980s, only twenty states had statutes that allowed their courts to use a juvenile
adjudication as a sentencing factor. Sanborn, supra note 92, tbl.2.
114. Sanborn, supra note 113, at 16.
115. See PRIVACY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE RECORDS, supra note 80, at 2 ("Recidivism rates
among juvenile offenders have not increased, but a relatively small percentage of juvenile
offenders are chronic and frequent recidivists, accounting for the vast majority of juvenile
offenses.").
116. U.S. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE, COMBATING VIOLENT CRIME: 24
RECOMMENDATIONS TO STRENGTHEN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 30 (1992).
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Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., a professor at the University of Central
Florida, conducted a study in 2000 to determine which jurisdictions
allow adult criminal courts to considerjuvenile records in determin-
ing adult criminal court sentences. 117 He found that all fifty-two
jurisdictions (fifty states, the District of Columbia, and Federal)
allow adult criminal courts to consider juvenile records as a factor
in determining sentencing. 118 According to Professor Sanborn's
study, forty-five jurisdictions have juvenile court statutes that
specifically authorize adult courts to use juvenile records during
sentencing. "' These forty-five jurisdictions overlap with thirty-five
jurisdictions that have "a variety of criminal court provisions (e.g.,
sentencing statutes and guidelines, court rules, presentence
investigation reports)" that clearly authorize consideration of
juvenile records in determining an adult's criminal court
sentence. 120 Sanborn found that "only New Hampshire lacks a law
or rule between its juvenile and criminal courts' codes that ex-
pressly tells adult courts to use the juvenile record to some extent
at sentencing." 121 In addition to these statutory provisions, "case
law in forty-sixjurisdictions (including New Hampshire) has upheld
factoring juvenile adjudications into criminal court sentencing." 122
Juvenile adjudications can factor into adult criminal sentencing
decisions in numerous ways. They can count as history points, 23
117. See Sanborn, supra note 113, at 17-34.
118. Id. at 7, 17.
119. Id. at 20.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. According to Sanborn's study, although six jurisdictions have statutes that
authorize the use of juvenile records in criminal court sentencing, nevertheless these
jurisdictions do not have case law governing the use ofjuvenile records. These jurisdictions
are Arkansas, Maine, Mississippi, New Mexico, Vermont, and the District of Columbia.
123. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(dX2)(A) (2001) (instructing
a judge to "add 2 points ... for each adult or juvenile sentence to confinement of at least sixty
days if the defendant was released from such confinement within five years of his
commencement of the instant offense"); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4724(cX3) (2001) ("The
department of corrections shall have access to any juvenile records maintained by the Kansas
bureau of investigation or the department of social and rehabilitation services for use in
determining the person's criminal history classification.").
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aggravating factors, 124 or "strikes. "125 According to Sanborn's study,
only two states-Arizona and Georgia-clearly prevent adult courts
from enhancing criminal sentences based on juvenile adjudica-
tions. 12
6
The fact that almost every jurisdiction allows the use of juvenile
adjudications as a factor in determining adult criminal sentences,
however, does not mean that this practice is constitutional. 27 The
practice of using juvenile adjudications to enhance adult criminal
convictions has attracted criticism from many scholars. Some
scholars argue it is unconstitutional to use juvenile adjudications
for enhancement purposes at all. 28
Although many commentators have vehemently attacked the
use of juvenile adjudications for enhancement purposes because
juveniles are not afforded the same procedural due process
safeguards as adults, the Supreme Court has conveniently ignored
these procedural due process issues. 129 Barry C. Feld, a professor at
the University of Minnesota Law School, has argued "[lit is ...
inconsistent to use less stringent procedures to obtain convictions
124. In North Carolina and Tennessee juvenile records act as aggravating factors within
the guidelines' structure. Similarly, juvenile records serve as an aggravating factor in the
adult sentencing of six nonguidelines states. Sanborn, supra note 113, at 23-24.
125. For discussions of whether juvenile adjudications should count as "strikes," see Lisa
Forquer, Comment, California's Three Strikes Law-Should a Juvenile Adjudication Be a
Ball or a Strike?, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1297 (1995); Christine Markel, Note & Comment, A
Swing and a Miss: California's Three Strikes Law, 17 WHITIER L. REV. 651(1996); Amanda
K Packel, Comment, Juvenile Justice and the Punishment of Recidivists Under California's
Three Strikes Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1157 (2002). Currently "California, Louisiana, and Texas
allow juvenile adjudications to serve as all but the final strike." Sanborn, supra note 113, at
24. In these jurisdictions, thus in theory, a defendant who is convicted in an adult court for
a crime which does not carry a potential life sentence could receive a life sentence because
his juvenile adjudications count as prior "strikes." Id.
126. Nevertheless, in these states juvenile records can be proffered to make adult
offenders ineligible for probation. Sanborn, supra note 113, at 21.
127. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 548 (1971) ("The fact that a
practice is followed by a large number of states is not conclusive in a decision as to whether
that practice accords with due process ....") (quoting Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798
(1952)).
128. See Feld, supra note 87, at 902-15; Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy:
A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965 (1995) [hereinafter Feld,
Violent Youth and Public Policy]; Sanborn, supra note 92, at 238; Dormont, supra note 89,
at 1769; Stetzer, supra note 79, at 316.
129. Feld, supra note 87, at838 (arguing that the Court in McKeiver sidestepped the issues
of procedural justice raised by the recognition that punishment plays an increasing, if not
dominant, role in juvenile court sentencing practices).
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in juvenile court in the name of rehabilitation, and then to use
those same convictions to enhance subsequent criminal sentences
as adults."30 As the juvenile justice system becomes increasingly
punitive, it becomes more important for juveniles to receive due
process safeguards.
In a report for the Department of Justice, Robert Belair justified
allowing juvenile court records to factor into an adult court
sentencing, stating:
By extending many of the adult criminal due process protections
to juvenile trials, the Court has imbued the juvenile trial with
the elements of fairness, impartiality and dispositiveness
customarily associated with adult trials. Thus, when a juvenile
is found delinquent today there is reason for confidence in the
fairness and accuracy of that judgment.'
The problem with the supposition that juvenile delinquents should'
be treated more like adult criminals is that it assumes that
juveniles receive the same, or close to the same, procedural safe-
guards as adults. This is not a safe assumption.
V. SCRUTINIZING PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS BEFORE COUNTING
JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS AS PRIOR CONVICTIONS FOR APPRENDI
PURPOSES
The Apprendi exception is based on an assumption that there
were sufficient procedural safeguards in the previous conviction
for the Court to accept its reliability.3 2 While it may be safe to
assume that prior adult convictions are reliable because they
contained sufficient procedural safeguards, it is not safe to make
this assumption with respect to juvenile adjudications. Juvenile
adjudications should not count as prior convictions for Apprendi
purposes unless a court carefully scrutinizes the safeguards
attached to the adjudication because juvenile adjudications differ
from adult convictions in many ways. The differences between the
two systems arise from fundamentally different goals. Historically,
130. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra note 128, at 1064.
131. BELAIR, supra note 97, at 24.
132. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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the juvenile system focused on rehabilitation, while the adult
system focused on punishment to fit the crime.133
There are several substantial differences between the juvenile
justice system and the adult criminal court system which impact
whether a juvenile adjudication should count as a prior conviction
for Apprendi purposes. First, juveniles are not provided with the
same procedural safeguards as adults. Although the Court has
extended many Fifth and Sixth Amendment due process rights to
juveniles, 34 it refused to extend the right to a trial by jury. 3 In
McKeiver, the Court did not grant juveniles the right to a jury trial
because it refused to superimpose on the juvenile system the
formalities of the adult system and instead stressed the paternal
attention that the juvenile court system can give to juveniles.3 6 As
the goals of the juvenile system converge with the goals of the adult
system,137 the justification for providing juveniles with fewer
procedural safeguards disappears. Second, in practice, juveniles
often do not receive the right to counsel despite the Court's
mandate in Gault.3 s Third, the rehabilitative nature of juvenile
adjudications makes it more difficult to track a juvenile's record
than an adult's criminal record. There is a lack of uniformity in
juvenile recordkeeping systems among states as well as a lack of
uniformity in states' approaches to sealing and expunging juvenile
records. 139
All of these differences taken together suggest that the narrow
prior conviction exception of Apprendi should not apply automati-
cally to a juvenile adjudication without further inquiry. A court
should not make the blanket assumption that a juvenile adjudica-
tion contained sufficient procedural safeguards to warrant its use
in adult criminal court sentencing. Judges need to make case-by-
133. See discussion supra Part III.A.
134. These due process rights include the privilege against self-incrimination, the right
to adequate notice, the right to confront and cross-examine accusers, and the right to
assistance of counsel. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-34, 41, 55, 57 (1967). The Court also has
extended the reasonable doubt standard of proof to juvenile proceedings. In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 368 (1970); see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
135. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
136. Id. at 550.
137. See discussion supra Part III.C.
138. 387 U.S. at 55-57; see discussion infra Part V.C.
139. See discussion infra Part V.D.
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case determinations by scrutinizing the procedural safeguards
actually provided to a juvenile before they can accept the "fact" of
a juvenile adjudication as reliable for Apprendi purposes.
A. Jury Trial
The Court's two main rationales in McKeiver for not extending
the right to a jury trial to juveniles were that juvenile adjudications
are informal and they are not criminal. 4" For these same reasons,
courts should not automatically count juvenile adjudications as
prior convictions for Apprendi purposes. The Sixth Amendment
guarantees the right to a jury "[iun all criminal prosecutions."' In
McKeiver, the Court stated that juvenile adjudications were not
criminal and that a right-to-a-jury requirement would formalize the
juvenile system and "most likely be disruptive of the unique nature
of the juvenile process. " 142 The Court's justification for not extend-
ing the right to ajury trial to juveniles was that "the juvenile court
proceeding has not yet been held to be a 'criminal prosecution,'
within the meaning and reach of the Sixth Amendment." 3
Some scholars have argued that there should be a per se rule that
prohibits using juvenile adjudications for enhancement purposes
when the juvenile was not provided with a jury trial.'" The basic
argument is that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a
jury "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,"" 5 and because a juvenile adju-
dication is a "criminal prosecution," a nonjuryjuvenile adjudication
violates the Sixth Amendment."" Alternatively, nonjury juvenile
140. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 541, 550.
141. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
142. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 540 (quoting In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 349-50 (1970) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). The Court stated that the imposition of the jury trial on the
juvenile court system "would not strengthen greatly, if at all, the factfinding ftnction, ...
would not remedy the defects of the system, ... [and] would bring with it into that system the
traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary system." Id. at 547, 550.
143. Id. at 541.
144. See, e.g., Stetzer, supra note 79, at 316 ("Juvenile Adjudications Entered Without the
Right to Trial by Jury Are Constitutionally Infirm for Use in Enhancing Adult Sentences.").
145. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
146. In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court extended the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment because "trial by jury in criminal cases is
fundamental to the American scheme of justice." 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). As one scholar
notes, the Court's reasoning in Duncan should also apply to juvenile proceedings:
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adjudications should not be used for enhancement purposes because
"equal protection demands that juveniles who are being treated
similarly to adults should receive rights similar to those extended
to adults."47
The Court could choose to resolve the Third, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits' split based solely on the issue that juveniles do not receive
the right to a jury trial. In doing so, the Court could reconsider
McKeiver by extending the right to a jury trial to juveniles in all
juvenile cases, or at least in those adjudications involving serious
crimes. The drawbacks with this approach, as the Court recognized
in McKeiver, are that these costly new requirements would
burden the juvenile justice system and that "[i]f the formalities
of the criminal adjudicative process are to be superimposed upon
the juvenile court system, there is little need for its separate
existence." 4 ' Alternatively, the Court could conclude, based on
McKeiver, that juvenile adjudications are more civil than criminal
in nature, and therefore that juvenile adjudications should not
count as prior convictions for purposes of the Apprendi exception.
B. Informality of Juvenile Courts
Lack of procedural formality in the juvenile justice system de-
creases the reliability of a juvenile court's factfinding. In further-
ance of the goal of rehabilitation, a judge takes into account a
juvenile's social background in fashioning the appropriate remedy,
and therefore, "judges are exposed to far more prejudicial informa-
tion about a youth ... and this influences the likelihood of both
conviction and institutional confinement."149
In Duncan, the Supreme Court emphasized that the purposes of the jury trial
were to check against arbitrary actions by the government, to safeguard against
the overzealous prosecutor and the biased judge and to assure fair trials. Jury
trials are necessary in juvenile court for the same reasons. Juries would not
have access to the youths' records, would not know defendants from previous
offenses or stages in the court process, and would not realize which juveniles
had been held in detention.
Sanborn, supra note 92, at 236 (footnote omitted).
147. Sanborn, supra note 92, at 236.
148. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971).
149. Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile
Court, 69 MiNN. L. REV. 141, 246 (1984).
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In addition, many juvenile matters result in no judicial fact-
finding. A prosecutor often elects to use pretrial diversion rather
than proceeding to an adjudication. Pretrial diversion aims to
"avoid the stigma and negative labelling of formal court interven-
tion."150 A prosecutor may choose to "divert any youth who has not
been diverted previously, and who is or could be charged with any
crime other than an offense against the person."151
Pretrial diversion could be used to enhance an adult sentence
under a literal reading of the ACCA. Under the ACCA, "the term
'conviction' includes a finding that a person has committed an act
of juvenile delinquency involving a violent felony."'52 The ACCA
further defines the term "violent felony" to mean "any crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any
act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying of a
firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be punishable by
imprisonment for such term if committed by an adult."'53 The
language "any act of juvenile delinquency" does not, on its face,
formally require ajuvenile adjudication; ajuvenile could commit an
act of juvenile delinquency without being adjudicated delinquent.
Therefore, in theory, a pretrial diversion could be used as a
predicate "conviction" for the ACCA despite the fact that there had
been no formal judicial factfmding.
C. Right to Counsel
Despite the Court's mandate in Gault that every juvenile in a
juvenile court has the right to counsel, many states have failed to
comply with this demand.'54 Juveniles still consistently do not
receive the right to counsel in many states.'55 In a study comparing
150. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra note 128, at 1095.
151. Id. at 1097.
152. Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(C) (2000).
153. Id. § 924(e)(2XB) (emphasis added).
154. PATRICIA PURITZ ET AL., ABA JUvENILE JUSTICE CENTER, A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS 21 & n.24 (1995) (citing Barry C. Feld, In re Gault Revisited: A Cross-State
Comparison of the Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court, 34 CRIME & DELINQ. 393 (1988)
[hereinafter Feld, Cross.State Comparison]); Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra
note 128, at 1109-10.
155. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra note 128, at 1109-10.
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rates of representation in six states, three of the six states provided
counsel to only about half of their juveniles.' Many juveniles are
"adjudicated delinquent without the presence or assistance of an
attorney, which further prejudices the accuracy of the fact-finding
process.
There are many explanations for why so many juveniles are still
unrepresented-a common one being that juveniles waive their
right to counsel. 5 8 Indeed, juveniles may waive this right."Parents
may be reluctant to retain an attorney or accept the appointment
of a public defender for their child," because some counties "seek
reimbursement for the expenses and attorney's fees expended on
behalf of the child."" 9 Additionally, "in some jurisdictions the
assistance of counsel is technically available, but children must
formally request the appointment of an attorney."6 ° Another
possible reason for undercompliance may be that rural areas do not
have sufficient legal services to provide every juvenile with an
attorney.' 61
D. Juvenile Recordkeeping Systems
States have widely varying recordkeeping practices which affect
the use of juvenile adjudications in adult courts. 62 An adult court
156. Id. at 1109-10 & n.658 (citing Feld, Cross-State Comparison, supra note 154, at 401
(indicating youth representation rates ranging from 38% in North Dakota, 48% in Minnesota,
and 53% in Nebraska, to 85% in California, 90% in Pennsylvania, and 96% in New York)).
157. Feld, supra note 149, at 246. In Minnesota, for example, "[i]n the majority of
delinquency/status offense cases (62%) there is not representation." Id. at 189 n. 160 (quoting
K FINE, OUT OF HOME PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN IN MINNESOTA: A RESEARCH REPORT 48
(1983)).
158. BARRY C. FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE JUVENILE
COURTS 28 (1993).
159. Id.
160. PURITZ ETAL., supra note 154, at 22.
161. IJA-ABA JOINT COMM'N ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS RELATING TO
PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS 93-94 (1980).
162. According to the U.S. Department of Justice:
ITihere is often a lack of uniformity in recordkeeping practices regarding
juvenile records among law enforcement agencies even within the same state.
How the records are created, when they are created, what they contain, the
length of retention, and where the records are retained, if they are retained at
all, are some of the decisions which are typically left to the discretion of
individual law enforcement agencies-all of which have an impact on the use
and availability of juvenile history records.
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can only use a juvenile adjudication for enhancement purposes if it
can find it. Unlike adult criminal courts where criminal records are
uniformly available, there may be widely inconsistent treatment of
two similarly situated juveniles because of the inability to track
juvenile records. For example, two individuals with the same prior
juvenile adjudication, who are each facing an adult sentence, may
be treated differently because one state kept good records while the
other state sealed and expunged the records or cannot retrieve
them. Among the factors that affect the use of juvenile adjudica-
tions in compiling an adult's criminal history are the creation of a
juvenile record, the ability to track a juvenile throughout a state or
even the country, and the sealing and expungement practices of a
state. 16'
Sealing and expunging practices affect the use of juvenile
adjudications in adult courts. Some jurisdictions seal juvenile
records based on state statutes, while others act pursuant to court
orders, agency administrative standards, state regulations, or city
or county ordinances. 164 The rationale behind sealing and expunging
practices is:
To get away from the notion that the child is to be dealt with as
a criminal; to save [him] from the brand of criminality, the
brand that sticks to [him] for life; to take [him] in hand and
instead of first stigmatizing and then reforming [him] to protect
[him] from the stigma.165
E. Arbitrariness in Adjudication
Prosecutors have wide discretion in determining whether to
prosecute a juvenile in juvenile court. They have discretion to
decide which juveniles are diverted before trial and which juveniles
are transferred. 16 6 Only about half of the juveniles police refer to a
RECORDKEEPING SYSTEMS, supra note 84, at 4.
163. See id.
164. Id. at 13.
165. BELAIR, supra note 97, at 14 (quoting Mack, supra note 79, at 109).
166. For example, one statistic reflects that "[bletween 1987 and 1994, the number of
delinquency cases judicially waived [i.e., transferred] to criminal court [each year] grew 73%
(from 6800 to 11,700)." OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT 170 (1999).
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local prosecutor's office or juvenile probation department are
actually formally prosecuted.1
7
This discretion leads to the obvious criticism that some juve-
niles will be exposed to the juvenile system more than others.
The use of an adult's prior juvenile record against him during
sentencing will depend heavily on whether he was transferred,
adjudicated delinquent, or never adjudicated against as a juvenile.
Consequently, the informality of the juvenile system raises both due
process and fundamental fairness concerns.
VI. APPROACHES TO RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
This Note has analyzed numerous issues that the Supreme
Court should consider in resolving the circuit split as to whether
juvenile adjudications should count as prior convictions for
Apprendi exception purposes. The Court will eventually have to
address these issues and resolve the split among the Third, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits. The Court could agree with the Third and
Eighth Circuits' rationale in Jones and Smalley and find that a
jury trial is not a prerequisite for a juvenile adjudication to
count as a prior conviction. Such a holding, however, would ignore
the fundamental differences between juvenile adjudications and
adult convictions. 68 Alternatively, the Court could agree with the
Ninth Circuit's rationale in Tighe and rule that the Apprendi
exception for prior convictions does not include juvenile adjudica-
tions. This approach would require declaring the ACCA, which
explicitly states that certain acts of juvenile delinquency are
considered convictions, unconstitutional because the juvenile did
not have the right to a jury trial.'69 In a less likely approach, the
Court could decide not to follow any of the circuits' approaches but
rather choose to reconsider its holding in McKeiver by providing all
juveniles with the right to a jury trial.'7 0
167. See PRIVACY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE RECORDS, supra note 80, at 24.
168. See discussion supra Part V.
169. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
170. For an argument that the Supreme Court should override McKeiver, see Barry C.
Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver: Sentence Enhancements
Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38 WAKE
FORST L. REV. 1111 (2003).
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In light of the substantial differences between juvenile adjudica-
tions and adult convictions, the best approach is for the Court to
modify the Apprendi exception for prior convictions. The Court
should set forth explicit standards and mechanisms for scrutinizing
the procedural safeguards actually afforded to a juvenile in a
particular case before the Apprendi exception would apply.
A. Problems with the Smalley and Jones Approach
The Supreme Court denied certiorari to Smalley in January
2003.171 Although Smalley may not have been an appropriate
vehicle for resolving the circuit split, the Court could eventually
resolve the split by adopting the Smalley court's reasoning. Review
of the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Jones could
provide such a vehicle for the Court to take the Smalley approach.
The issue in Smalley was whether a juvenile adjudication could
count as a prior conviction for the ACCA to be applicable.'72 The
court recognized that "the question of whether juvenile adjudica-
tions should be exempt from Apprendi's general rule should not
turn on the narrow parsing of words, but on an examination of
whether juvenile adjudications, like adult convictions, are so
reliable that due process of law is not offended by such an exemp-
tion."'73 Despite the fact that Smalley had not been afforded a jury
trial at hisjuvenile adjudications, the court concluded thatjuveniles
like Smalley still receive safeguards that "are more than sufficient
to ensure the reliability that Apprendi requires." 74
The Smalley court erred in assuming that juvenile adjudications
always possess sufficient procedural safeguards to be reliable as
prior convictions. Even assuming that the Smalley court was
correct in holding that the right to a jury trial is not necessary to
ensure the reliability of a juvenile adjudication, it erred by not
considering whether Smalley received other procedural safeguards.
171. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
172. United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1031 (8th Cir. 2002).
173. Id. at 1032-33.
174. Id. at 1033. The court noted that: "For starters, juvenile defendants have the right
to notice, the right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the
privilege against self-incrimination.... Ajudge in a juvenile proceeding, moreover, must find
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before he or she can convict." Id. (citing In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 368 (1970)).
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For instance, the Smalley court did not address, nor did it appear
to know, whether Smalley had an attorney present at his juvenile
adjudication, and if not, why he did not have one. Did a parent,
guardian, or state-appointed representative waive that right?
The Jones court adopted essentially the Smalley approach.
Although both courts held that juvenile adjudications can count as
prior convictions for Apprendi purposes, the Jones court engaged in
a more in-depth discussion of which procedural safeguards must be
present at a juvenile adjudication. It addressed the Sixth Amend-
ment issue at the appellant's behest. The court attached a presump-
tion of regularity to Jones' prior adjudication. Jones had the burden
of proof to establish the constitutional infirmity of his Sixth
Amendment right. He failed to meet this burden of proof because
the record was silent as to whether he had representation and he
did not even allege that he was not represented by counsel. If Jones
had claimed affirmatively that he was not represented by counsel,
then the court would have had to engage in judicial factfinding to
determine whether he was represented. The court avoided this
judicial factfinding through the presumption of regularity.'75
Unlike the Smalley court, which failed to consider whether
Smalley had other procedural safeguards during his juvenile
adjudication, the Jones court actually inquired into whether Jones
received other procedural safeguards. 176 The court recognized that
Jones could have attacked his conviction on other procedural
grounds; for example, he could have argued that he was not found
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' 7
B. Adopting the Tighe Approach
Rather than adopt the Smalley approach, the Court could decide
that the Apprendi exception for prior convictions does not apply to
juvenile adjudications. In Tighe, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
175. See discussion supra Part II.C.
176. United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 698 (3d Cir. 2003) ("On a final note, we have
no reason to doubt that Jones was provided other procedural safeguards during his juvenile
adjudication.").
177. The record of Jones'juvenile adjudication states, "after a ful hearing, the Court finds
byproofbeyond a reasonable doubt that [Lester Jones] has committed the ... delinquent acts."
Id. at 698. The record thus establishes proof beyond a reasonable doubt of delinquency, but
not necessarily of guilt.
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"Apprendi's narrow 'prior conviction' exception is limited to prior
convictions resulting from proceedings that afforded the procedural
necessities of a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thus, the 'prior conviction' exception does not include nonjury
juvenile adjudications."'78 Although this per se exclusion would be
a clear and easy ruling to follow, it runs counter to the modern
trend of severely punishing repeat offenders, including juveniles,
with sentence enhancements.
Another way to adopt the Tighe approach would be to modify the
Apprendi exception based on the fundamental differences between
juvenile adjudications and prior adult convictions. The Court held
in Apprendi that "[oither than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt."'79 The Court did not define what it
meant by a "prior conviction." The Court could clarify that the
Apprendi exception does not include juvenile adjudications.
C. Reconsidering McKeiver
The Court could reconsider McKeiver to determine whether a
juvenile adjudication is fundamentally civil or criminal in nature.
In McKeiver, the Court held that "trial by jury in the juvenile
court's adjudicative stage is not a constitutional requirement."8 °
The Court sidestepped the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury trial "[i]n all criminal prosecutions" by determining that a
juvenile adjudication was not a criminal prosecution.
The Court could decide that the historical differences between the
juvenile and adult justice systems no longer exist and, therefore,
decide to provide juveniles with procedural safeguards identical to
those of adults. In other words, the Court could reconsider McKeiver
and extend the right to a jury trial to juveniles in all juvenile cases.
More than thirty years ago, in McKeiver, the Court stated that it
was not yet ready to characterize juvenile adjudications as criminal
for Sixth Amendment purposes. "' With the increasing emphasis on
178. United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 2001) (footnote omitted).
179. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (emphasis added).
180. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
181. Id. at 541.
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the criminal nature of juvenile adjudications in recent years,
however, it may be time for the Court to reexamine McKeiver. Now,
more than thirty years after McKeiver, the Apprendi exception
again raises the issue of whether it is proper to consider juvenile
adjudications civil for the purpose of denying juveniles the right to
a jury, or criminal for the Apprendi purpose of calling them "prior
convictions" and allowing a judge to use them to enhance an adult
sentence.'82 It is inconsistent to considerjuvenile adjudications civil
for one purpose, but then criminal for another. The Court could
resolve this inconsistency by either extending to juveniles the right
to a jury trial or determining that juvenile adjudications are not
prior convictions for Apprendi exception purposes. Although the
option of overruling McKeiver may be intuitively appealing to some
critics, it may be practically unrealistic; it would severely burden
the juvenilejustice system and would call into question the need for
a separate juvenile court system in the first place.
CONCLUSION: SCRUTINIZING JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS
Since juvenile adjudications are fundamentally different from
adult prior convictions in purpose and procedure, the Court should
adopt the Tighe approach with its blanket ban on counting juvenile
adjudications as prior convictions. Such a decision would mandate
that a juvenile adjudication cannot count as a prior conviction
unless the defendant was afforded a jury trial in his juvenile
proceeding."8 3 Assuming, however, that the Court is unwilling to
adopt this blanket approach, the Court needs to at least establish
basic standards and procedures for a trial judge orjury to scrutinize
juvenile adjudications to determine whether the juvenile was
afforded sufficient procedural safeguards for the court to rely on the
juvenile adjudication.
It appears that when the Court confronts the question of
whether juvenile adjudications should count as prior convictions
for Apprendi purposes, it will have three issues to address. First,
the Court must delineate a checklist of procedural safeguards that
182. Cf Stetzer, supra note 79, at 316 ("Kansas should not consider a juvenile proceeding
civil and rehabilitative in one context, but then criminal in another.").
183. See discussion supra Parts IV, V.A.
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constitute the basic minimum safeguards that must be present in
a juvenile adjudication before it can count as a prior conviction for
Apprendi purposes. 8 4 Second, the Court must establish who has
the burden of proof or production and what is required to meet that
burden. Finally, the Court will have to decide whether judicial
factfinding of the procedural safeguards present in the juvenile
adjudication should be performed by a judge or jury.185
A workable procedure would be to establish a rebuttable pre-
sumption that a juvenile adjudication has sufficient procedural
safeguards and reliability for it to be treated as an adult conviction.
A defendant would have to contest the use of his juvenile adjudica-
tion against him on the basis of some constitutional infirmity. A
trial judge would then have the responsibility to decide questions
of law and due process. For instance, if the trial judge determines
that the juvenile was not afforded the right to counsel, then he
would find it unconstitutional to count the prior adjudication as a
prior conviction. This is analogous to what the Third Circuit did in
United States v. Jones where it, in effect, employed a presumption
of regularity because the appellant failed to meet his burden of
establishing that his prior adjudication suffered from a constitu-
tional infirmity.
In the United States, our criminal court system usually reserves
questions of fact for the jury and questions of law for the judge. The
Apprendi exception for prior convictions marks an exception to this
general rule based on the "certainty" of the prior conviction. 8 ' In
Apprendi, the Court held that the fact of a prior conviction need not
be submitted to a jury. If the defendant contests his prior juvenile
adjudication by claiming that it contained a constitutional infirmity,
and if the defendant's claim raises factual issues that cannot be
resolved summarily, then a court or a jury must engage in fact-
184. This list of basic minimum procedural safeguards could include, but need not be
limited to, the following rights: the right to fair notice, the right to proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, the right to a jury trial, the right to any exculpatory evidence, and the right to
counsel.
185. Judicial scrutiny may involve a judge or jury in the following factfmding: was the
juvenile represented by an attorney, was the juvenile adjudicated delinquent by a jury, and
does being adjudicated "delinquent" establish "guilt"? The required factflmding also may
involve lengthy pretrial determinations so that a defendant will know the potential sentence
he faces before trial.
186. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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finding before it can decide whether to count the juvenile adjudica-
tion as a prior conviction for Apprendi purposes. This factfinding,
which calls into question the "certainty" of the prior conviction, is
no longer within the bounds of the Apprendi exception and is the
type of factfinding which Apprendi requires a jury to conduct.
Allowing the court to make factual determinations of contested
facts which may require lengthy hearings and extensive evidence
would fly in the face of the original intent of Apprendi.
The Court should not ignore the fundamental differences between
an adult conviction and a juvenile adjudication. The original focus
of the juvenile system on rehabilitation has changed over the years.
If the Court does not recognize that the juvenile system has evolved
to embrace the concept of punishment, then juveniles will receive
the "worst of both worlds ... [they will] get[] neither the protections
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treat-
ment postulated for children."' 87
Jeremy W. Hochberg
187. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) (citing Handler, supra note 101, at
20041 1193
